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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
followed where there was a contingent remainder, 21 but not when
the remainder was already vested and a termination could only accel-
erate the power of enjoyment.22
In the principal case the tax was imposed pursuant to Section
811(d) (2) since the trust was established in 1929. The Court, in
including the trust corpora within the gross estate, relied entirely
upon the Holmes case, and refused to draw any distinction based
upon the dissimilar factual situations. In the Holmes case, unlike
the instant case, the settlor retained the power to accumulate the in-
come indefinitely,23 and, depending on the date of termination, the
trust corpora might have gone to his sons, their issue, his wife or her
heirs. In the present case, only the beneficiaries (or their heirs by
operation of law) could take. It is respectfully suggested that such
a distinction could and should have altered the result.
M
TORTS - AsSAULT BY FELLOW INMATE NOT WITHI FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS AcT.-After being convicted as a user of narcotics,
plaintiff chose treatment in a federal hospital in lieu of a prison term.
While in the hospital he was stabbed by another inmate. In an ac-
tion against the Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act,'
plaintiff alleged a negligent omission to provide sufficient guards
against such a contingency. The Government defended on the ground
that the federal act expressly excepted from the purview of the Gov-
ernment's waiver of immunity provision, "any claim arising out of
assault, or battery .... ", 2 The Court, in rejecting the plaintiff's con-
tention that the exception precludes recovery only when the assault
or battery is inflicted by an employee of the United States Govern-
ment, granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding
that the exception is not restricted to Government employees, and that
any claim based on an injury resulting from an assault or battery is
barred under the Act. Panella v. United States, Civil No. 69-16,
S.D.N.Y., Dec. 9, 1953.
Through the Tort Claims Act the Federal Government has
waived its immunity from suit for the torts of its employees, in situ-
ations where a private person would be liable pursuant to the lex loci
21 See Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Newbold's Estate, 158 F2d 694 (2d
Cir. 1946).
22 See Hays' Estate v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 181 F.2d 169 (5th Cir.
1950).
23 See Comm'r of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480, 484(1946).
128 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2674 (Supp. 1950).
228 U.S.C. §2680(h) (Supp. 1950).
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delicti.3 There are, however, several enumerated exceptions to this
waiver,4 one of which is any claim arising out of assault or battery.
In respect to this latter provision, courts have interpreted similar fact
situations differently. In Lewis v. United States,5 the shooting of the
plaintiff upon refusal to halt when ordered, by an over-zealous sentry,
was found to have been an assault, while in Cerri v. United States 6
the wounding of an innocent bystander by a sentry was interpreted as
a mere failure to exercise due care. The apparent willingness of the
court in the Cerri case to find negligence rather than an intentional
tort was perhaps stimulated in part by a desire to bring this particular
plaintiff within the protection of the Tort Claims Act.
In the instant case, the plaintiff's status-whether prisoner or
voluntary patient-was left undetermined by the Court. Such a de-
termination would have been immaterial since the fact that the claim
arose out of a battery precluded relief on any theory. However, in
another context-a pure negligence situation-the position of the
plaintiff would have been pertinent. If he were a patient he might
have a remedy.7 If, on the other hand, he were a prisoner, he would
be barred from recovery under the rule of Sigmon v. United States,8
where it was held that prisoners may not avail themselves of the Act.
A basis for this decision was the rationale in Feres v. United States,9
where recovery was denied to a serviceman injured while on duty. In
the latter case, the Court reasoned that the actions of servicemen based
on service-incurred injuries should not be dependent on the differing
negligence law of the states in which they happened to be stationed-
especially since they have no choice as to their geographical location.' 0
The limited tort relief available against the Federal Government con-
trasts with the liberal attitude manifested by the State of New York,
where prisoners on parole have a tort remedy against the state for
injuries incurred in prison.:"
328 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. 1950).
4 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (Supp. 1950).5 194 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1952).
880 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
7 See Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950) ; Grigalauskas
v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1951), aff'd, 195 F.2d 494 (5th
Cir. 1952); Dishman v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1950).
8 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953); see Van Zuch v. United States,
118 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Shew v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 1
(M.D.N.C. 1953). For a critical appraisal of the Siginon case, see Note, 63
YALE L. J. 418 (1954).
9340 U.S. 135 (1950). H-owever, servicemen may recover against the
Government for the negligent conduct of its agents which causes injuries not
incident to service. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). In addi-
tion, discharged veterans may recover for negligent treatment in veterans'
hospitals subsequent to their discharge. Santana v. United States, 175 F.2d
320 (1st Cir. 1949) ; Brown v. United States, No. 22826, 2d Cir., Jan. 5, 1954.
10 See Feres v. United States, 340 US. 135, 143 (1950).
"1 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 510, fluffy v. State, 197 Misc. 569, 94 N.Y.S.2d 757(Ct. CI. 1950). However, even where the prisoner is released from prison,
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As a policy consideration, courts may be reluctant to extend the
protection of the Tort Claims Act to a malefactor such as the plaintiff,
though not a prisoner in the narrow sense. If given the right to sue
while incarcerated, the prisoner may disrupt prison routine and dis-
cipline by seizing upon every opportunity to leave the prison confines
for trips to the courthouse. 12 Moreover, servicemen 13 and many
federal prison inmates 14 are protected by some form of injury com-
pensation benefits. Hence, cases denying tort relief to servicemen
and prisoners have rested, at least in part, upon the premise that Con-
gress did not intend to afford them more than one remedy.15
Therefore, where servicemen and prisoners are concerned, the de-
cision in the instant case achieved a commendable result. However,
the case highlights a possible inequity in the provision of the Tort
Claims Act which excludes suits arising out of assault and battery.
The plaintiff's complaint was based on an alleged negligent omission
of Government employees, and not on an assault and battery of an
inmate. Nevertheless, the Court, in construing the provision, stated
that it does not refer to claims of assault and battery, since Congress
could have, but did not, so word it. Consequently, in cases where an
assault or battery results in injury to a person other than a serviceman
or prisoner, due to the negligence of Government employees, there
could be no relief under the Act. An enlightened republic ought not
to suffer its citizens to receive such injuries without recourse. "The
exemption of the sovereign from suit involves hardship enough where
consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refine-
ment of construction where consent has been announced." 16
X
TORTS-LIABILITY FOR SOLICITATION OF FORMER EMPLOYER'S
CusTOM Es.-Plaintiff advertising agency sought damages from its
former account executives alleged to have been sustained as the result
of a conspiracy by the latter to deprive plaintiff of its principal cus-
his suit against the Federal Government for injuries incurred during his
confinement are barred. See Van Zuch v. United States, supra note 8.
12 See Duffy v. State, supra note 11.
13 See Feres v. United States, supra note 10 at 144 (statutes collected
therein).
1448 STAT. 1211-1212 (1934), 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (Supp. 1952).
15 See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950) (serviceman);
Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906, 911 (W.D. Va. 1953) (prisoner).
16 Anderson v. John L. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N.Y. 140, 147, 153
N.E. 28, 29-30 (1926) [quoted with approval in reference to the Tort Claims
Act in United States v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383
(1949)].
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